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THE LEGACY OF SREBRENICA: 
POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF 
REDUCING LIABILITY FOR TROOP 
CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES IN MODERN 
UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 
KELSEY GASSELING* 
Abstract: In 2014 the District Court of The Hague returned its decision in a case 
concerning peacekeeper (Dutchbat) wrongdoing during the 1995 massacre at 
Srebrenica, Bosnia-Herzegovina. The district court dismissed the UN as party to 
the suit, basing this decision on the organization’s statutory immunity from pros-
ecution. As a basis for holding the Netherlands liable for Dutchbat’s actions, the 
district court utilized the effective control standard. This standard triggered liabil-
ity for conduct undertaken either under direct order from Dutch officials, or in 
violation of the mission mandate. The district court strictly interpreted effective 
control, concluding the Netherlands was liable for conduct only insofar as it per-
tained to Dutchbat personnel who actively separated male Muslim refugees, who 
were later executed by the Bosnian Serbian Army. The decision reflected a com-
mitment to limiting Member States’ liability so as to sustain enthusiastic troop 
contribution to peacekeeping. This policy could have negative repercussions as 
peacekeepers adopt increasingly complex responsibilities, especially in areas af-
flicted by terrorism. These missions frequently involve asymmetrical warfare, 
and some have become the most dangerous on record. Zealously encouraging 
Member States to deploy troops to areas under constant threat of unpredictable 
terrorist acts strongly calls into question the prudence of this policy. 
INTRODUCTION 
After the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina declared its independence 
from the Republic of Yugoslavia in March 1992, armed conflict between Bos-
nian Muslims and Serbian militia forces erupted across the eastern region of 
the country.1 In response, the United Nations (UN) extended the mandate of 
                                                                                                                           
 * Kelsey Gasseling is a Staff Writer for the Boston College International & Comparative Law 
Review. 
 1 See Rb. ’s-Gravenhage [Hague District Court] 16 juli 2014, No. 09/295247 / HA ZA 07-2973, 
¶ 2.3 (Mothers of Srebrenica/Netherlands) (Mothers of Srebrenica IV) (Neth.), http://uitspraken.
rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2014:8748 [https://perma.cc/RN9M-6MYS]; 
Srebrenica in Summary, HAGUE JUST. PORTAL (Aug. 7, 2008), http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/
index.php?id=9564 [https://perma.cc/VDN9-V6VV]. 
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the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to facilitate delivery of humanitarian 
aid and protect designated “safe areas” within Bosnia-Herzegovina.2 Srebreni-
ca, an enclave of Bosnian Muslim refugees,3 was one such safe area near Bos-
nia’s border with Serbia.4 In July 1995, UNPROFOR forces, comprised of ap-
proximately 600 Dutch peacekeepers (Dutchbat) were overcome by members 
of the Bosnian Serbian Army (BSA) and retreated, along with 20,000–25,000 
refugees, from Srebrenica to their encampment in the neighboring town of 
Potočari.5 Following the exodus from Srebrenica and subsequent evacuation 
from Potočari, the BSA captured and killed between 7000 and 8000 Bosnian 
Muslim men.6 
The Srebrenica massacre and ensuing legal actions have had forceful re-
percussions in the international legal community, particularly concerning the 
roles and responsibilities of current UN peacekeeping operations across the 
globe.7 In a civil suit in the District Court of the Hague in June 2007, the Asso-
ciation of the Mothers of Srebrenica and ten individual claimants brought an 
action against the State of the Netherlands (State) and the UN.8 They claimed 
the State and UN were jointly liable for failing to fulfill their duty to protect 
the refugees who were removed from the safe area and executed by BSA.9 The 
district court dismissed the UN as party to the suit, asserting it had no jurisdic-
tion over the case due to the UN’s immunity in matters of litigation.10 The 
                                                                                                                           
 2 Mothers of Srebrenica IV, ¶¶ 2.12, 2.4–2.5. 
 3 Id. ¶ 2.5. 
 4 Srebrenica in Summary, supra note 1. 
 5 Mothers of Srebrenica IV, ¶¶ 2.34–.35; Srebrenica in Summary, supra note 1. 
 6 Mothers of Srebrenica IV, ¶ 2.43; Kristen E. Boon, The United Nations as Good Samaritan: 
Immunity and Responsibility, 16 CHI. J. INT’L L. 341, 378 (2016); Srebrenica in Summary, supra note 
1. 
 7 See generally Benjamin E. Brockman-Hawe, Questioning the UN’s Immunity in the Dutch 
Courts: Unresolved Issues in the Mothers of Srebrenica Litigation, 10 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. 
REV. 727 (2011) (weighing the costs and benefits of protecting the United Nations (UN) from prose-
cution in instances of peacekeeper malfeasance and suggesting that the case in The Hague Court of 
Appeal established a high standard of immunity that is unlikely to be overcome by the international 
law tenet of right of access to a court, even in the absence of alternative legal fora); Louise Bosetti et 
al., Peacekeeping in Cities: Is the UN Prepared?, UNITED NATIONS U.: CTR. FOR POL’Y RES. (Apr. 
12, 2016), http://cpr.unu.edu/peacekeeping-in-cities-is-the-un-prepared.html [https://perma.cc/UZ6X-
MGCV] (questioning the UN’s capacity to adequately quell rebel and terrorist groups engaged in 
unpredictable urban warfare, while not destabilizing “conflict economies” unwittingly through the 
mere sustained presence of UN peacekeepers). 
 8 See Mothers of Srebrenica IV, ¶¶ 2.45.1–.46; Brockman-Hawe, supra note 7, at 730. The Asso-
ciation represented approximately 6000 women who blamed the State of the Netherlands (State) and 
the UN for the loss of their loved ones at Srebrenica. See Jasna Hasanbasic, Comment, Liability in 
Peacekeeping Missions: A Civil Cause of Action for the Mothers of Srebrenica Against the Dutch 
Government and the United Nations, 29 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 415, 415 (2014). 
 9 See Mothers of Srebrenica IV, ¶ 3.1; Brockman-Hawe, supra note 7, at 728. 
 10 See Mothers of Srebrenica IV, ¶¶ 1.1, 4.3. 
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Court of Appeal of The Hague upheld this decision in 2010.11 In 2014 the dis-
trict court returned its final judgment, finding the State liable for only a small 
portion of the claims against it.12 This decision cemented the concept of the 
UN’s “absolute immunity,” and shifted a heavy portion of the liability for 
peacekeeper wrongdoing onto Member States contributing troops.13 
Part I of this Comment provides background facts of the Srebrenica mas-
sacre and the civil suit in the district court between the Association of the 
Mothers of Srebrenica and the State. Part II discusses the arguments and the 
ensuing decision by the district court. Part III examines the implications of the 
decision on current UN peacekeeping operations in areas afflicted by terror-
ism, using the UN peacekeeping operation in Mali as an example. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Establishment of UNPROFOR and Its Implementation in Srebrenica 
On February 21, 1992 the UN Security Council (Security Council) adopt-
ed Resolution 743, which established UNPROFOR as part of a peace agree-
ment between warring parties in Croatia.14 On June 8, 1992, the Security 
Council expanded UNPROFOR’s mandate to include Bosnia-Herzegovina af-
ter fighting erupted between the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina (ABiH) and 
BSA.15 Concurrent territorial conflicts between BSA and Bosnian Muslims in 
eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina led to the formation of numerous Muslim en-
claves.16 Srebrenica, located approximately ten kilometers southeast of the Yu-
goslavian border, was one such enclave with a population of approximately 
60,000 by early 1993.17 
In a public announcement in Srebrenica on March 14, 1993, then-
Commander of UNPROFOR, General P.P.L.A. Morillon, assured a crowd of 
Bosnian Muslims that “they were under the protection of the UN and that he 
                                                                                                                           
 11 Id.; see Hof ’s-Gravenhage [Appeal Court in The Hague] 30 mart 2010, No. 200.022.151/01 
(Mothers of Srebrenica/Netherlands) (Mothers of Srebrenica II) (Neth.), http://www.haguejustice
portal.net/Docs/Dutch%20cases/Appeals_Judgment_Mothers_Srebrenica_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/
5JLP-CLHW]. 
 12 See id. ¶¶ 4.341, .4. The district court dismissed the claims of claimants one through ten, de-
termining none of their lost family members fell under the Dutch peacekeepers’ (Dutchbat) protection 
during the transitional period. See id. The district court attributed liability to the State for the Associa-
tion’s claims, insofar as they related to men deported from Potočari on July 13, 1995 and executed by 
the Bosnian Serbian Army (BSA). Id. ¶¶ 4.339, 4.342. 
 13 See Mothers of Srebrenica II, ¶ 1.3; Brockman-Hawe, supra note 7, at 730, 744; Devika Hov-
ell, Due Process in the United Nations, 110 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 33 (2016); Hasanbasic, supra note 8, at 
445–46. 
 14 Mothers of Srebrenica IV, ¶ 2.2; S.C. Res. 743, ¶ 2 (Feb. 21, 1992). 
 15 Mothers of Srebrenica IV, ¶¶ 2.3–.4. 
 16 Id. ¶ 2.5. 
 17 Srebrenica in Summary, supra note 1; see Mothers of Srebrenica IV, ¶ 2.5. 
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would not abandon them.”18 Shortly thereafter, on April 16, 1993, the Security 
Council adopted Resolution 819, which held in part that Srebrenica should be 
free from hostile acts, that the BSA should cease their attack and withdraw 
from the region, and that the UN Secretary-General should take measures to 
increase UNPROFOR presence in the region.19 Between April 18 and May 6, 
1993, the UNPROFOR Commander oversaw a set of demilitarization agree-
ments between the leaders of BSA and ABiH.20 These agreements stipulated 
that ABiH fighters within the safe area had to resign their arms to UNPROFOR 
peacekeepers.21 In return, BSA General R. Mladić agreed to withdraw the 
heavy artillery that threatened the demilitarized zone.22 
On June 4, 1993 the Security Council adopted Resolution 836.23 This 
Resolution further extended the UNPROFOR mandate to allow Dutchbat to 
deter attacks, monitor the cease-fire, deliver humanitarian relief within the des-
ignated safe areas, and respond with force to any bombardment against the safe 
areas or deliberate obstruction of humanitarian convoys destined for these 
zones.24 Member States were also authorized to take all necessary measures 
through the use of air power to support UNPROFOR peacekeepers in the ful-
fillment of their mandate in and around the safe areas.25 
On March 3, 1994, Dutchbat mobilized and established its headquarters in 
the abandoned town of Potočari, about five kilometers from the town of Sre-
brenica.26 In addition to moving into the safe area, Dutchbat manned several 
observation posts in the region.27 Only a few months later, around June 1994, 
BSA began to interfere with humanitarian convoys destined for the safe area, 
limiting the supply of humanitarian aid and food that arrived to the refugees 
and Dutchbat forces.28 
On May 29, 1995, UNPROFOR Commander English Lieutenant General 
Sir R.A. Smith communicated a Post Airstrike Guidance missive to Dutch-
bat.29 Smith informed them that, in order to prevent unnecessary loss of life, 
execution of the UNPROFOR mandate was to be secondary to the security of 
UN personnel.30 Smith elaborated on the communication, instructing Dutchbat 
to hold positions it could practically reinforce or recover by counter attack, but 
                                                                                                                           
 18 Mothers of Srebrenica IV, ¶ 2.6. 
 19 Id. ¶ 2.7; S.C. Res. 819, ¶¶ 1–2, 4 (Apr. 16, 1993). 
 20 See Mothers of Srebrenica IV, ¶¶ 2.8, .10. 
 21 See id. 
 22 Id. ¶ 2.10. 
 23 S.C. Res. 836 (June 4, 1993). 
 24 Id. ¶ 5. 
 25 Id. ¶ 10. 
 26 See Mothers of Srebrenica IV, ¶¶ 2.15–.16. 
 27 See id. ¶ 2.16. 
 28 See id. ¶ 2.19. 
 29 Id. ¶¶ 2.18, .20. 
 30 Id. ¶ 2.20. 
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to abandon isolated positions within BSA territory when holding them would 
likely lead to substantial Dutchbat casualties.31 
B. The Fall of Srebrenica and Evacuation from Potočari 
The BSA attack began on June 3, 1995 with the siege of observation post 
OP-E, and culminated with the taking of the town of Srebrenica on July 11, 
1995.32 Throughout this period, BSA repeatedly shelled the town of Srebrenica 
and attacked observation posts in the surrounding safe area.33 Dutchbat com-
municated several requests for close air support to the UNPROFOR headquar-
ters in Croatia in order to deter BSA, but all requests were denied with the ex-
ception of one air strike on July 11, 1995.34 The absence of close air support 
caused Dutchbat to abandon multiple observation posts, blocking positions, 
and, eventually, the entire town of Srebrenica.35 
On the afternoon of July 11, 1995, before Srebrenica fell, tens of thou-
sands of Bosnian Muslim refugees fled in the direction of the Dutchbat en-
campment at Potočari, which had been designated a “mini safe area.”36 Be-
tween 20,000–25,000 refugees sought safety in Potočari while between 
10,000–15,000 Bosnian Muslim men fled instead into the woods nearby.37 
BSA captured an estimated 6000 of these men.38 That same evening, Dutchbat 
Battalion Commander, Dutch Lieutenant Colonel T.J.P. Karremans negotiated 
with BSA General Mladić to secure the evacuation of refugees from the mini 
safe area.39 On the afternoon of July 12, 1995, BSA sanctioned numerous vehi-
cles to begin evacuation.40 
Before evacuation began, BSA pronounced that it would be screening the 
refugees for able-bodied men who were under suspicion of committing war 
crimes.41 BSA pulled numerous men from the groups awaiting evacuation, and 
sent them off in separate vehicles for purported interrogation.42 In reality, BSA 
killed these men, along with those captured in the woods near Srebrenica, in a 
                                                                                                                           
 31 See id. 
 32 See id. ¶¶ 2.21, .34. 
 33 See id. ¶¶ 2.21–.25, .34. 
 34 See id. ¶¶ 2.21–.27, .31–.32. 
 35 See id. ¶¶ 2.21, .25–.26, .28, .33–.34. 
 36 See id. ¶ 2.35. 
 37 Id. ¶¶ 2.35–.36. 
 38 Id. ¶ 2.36. 
 39 See id. ¶¶ 2.39, 4.212. 
 40 Id. ¶ 2.40. Refugees went first to Tišca, then walked a few kilometers through no man’s land 
between BSA-controlled territory and Bosnian Muslim-controlled territory until they reached Kladanj. 
See id. ¶ 4.216. In Kladanj a Pakistani UN Battalion coordinated their transport to a provisional recep-
tion area in Tuzla. See id. 
 41 See id. ¶ 2.40. 
 42 See id.; Srebrenica in Summary, supra note 1. 
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series of mass executions between July 14 and July 17, 1995.43 During the cap-
ture of Srebrenica, more than 7000 Bosnian Muslim men from the safe area 
were taken from their families, executed, and thrown into mass graves by BSA 
forces.44 After the evacuation was completed, Dutchbat left Potočari and re-
turned home.45 
C. Subsequent Legal Action in the District Court of The Hague 
On June 4, 2007, the Association of the Mothers of Srebrenica along with 
ten individual claimants brought a civil suit in the district court against the 
State and UN.46 Claimants sought compensation for the loss of their male fam-
ily members, as well as declaratory judgments regarding the State’s and UN’s 
complicity in the massacre.47 The district court dismissed claims against the 
UN in an interim judgment on July 10, 2008, reasoning that because the UN 
enjoyed absolute immunity from prosecution, the district court had no jurisdic-
tion to hear the case against it.48 The court of appeal upheld this decision.49 On 
July 16, 2014, the district court found the State liable for a portion of claim-
ants’ loss, and ordered that the State pay costs of litigation in the amount of 
€6060.85.50 All other claims were dismissed.51 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. Scope of the Dispute 
The district court’s dismissal of the UN as a party to the suit clearly estab-
lished the UN’s absolute immunity from prosecution.52 This decision was 
made and later upheld as a matter of international public policy, recognizing 
that the key to the UN’s efficacy is its invulnerability to lawsuits.53 As such, 
                                                                                                                           
 43 See Mothers of Srebrenica IV, ¶ 2.43; Srebrenica in Summary, supra note 1. 
 44 Mothers of Srebrenica IV, ¶¶ 2.43, .45.2, .45.5, .45.10. 
 45 See id. ¶ 2.41. 
 46 Id. ¶ 3.1. 
 47 Id. 
 48 See id. ¶¶ 1.1, 4.3. 
 49 Id. ¶ 1.1. 
 50 Id. ¶¶ 5.1–.2. 
 51 Id. ¶ 5.4. 
 52 See Hof ’s-Gravenhage [Appeal Court in The Hague] 30 mart 2010, No. 200.022.151/01, ¶ 1.3 
(Mothers of Srebrenica/Netherlands) (Mothers of Srebrenica II) (Neth.); Rb. ’s-Gravenhage [Hague 
District Court] 16 juli 2014, No. 09/295247 / HA ZA 07-2973, ¶ 4.3 (Mothers of Srebreni-
ca/Netherlands) (Mothers of Srebrenica IV) (Neth.); Brockman-Hawe, supra note 7, at 736; Hovell, 
supra note 13, at 33; Srebrenica in Summary, supra note 1. 
 53 See Mothers of Srebrenica II, ¶ 4.2; Mothers of Srebrenica IV, ¶ 4.3. The UN enjoys immunity 
from all forms of legal process, regardless of jurisdiction, unless the UN explicitly waives its immuni-
ty in a specific case. G.A. Res. 22 (I), Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United 
Nations, art. II, §2 (Feb. 13, 1946). 
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the scope of Mothers of Srebrenica shifted entirely onto the State.54 Central to 
the outcome of the case was the district court’s determination of the extent of 
the State’s effective control over Dutchbat in and around Srebrenica, and 
whether it permitted unlawful acts under applicable international and national 
laws.55 
B. Attributable Failure 
Claimants’ central claim was that the State failed to fulfill its obligation to 
protect the populace in the mini safe area after the fall of Srebrenica.56 They 
argued that the State violated national and international humanitarian law, the 
UN Charter and UNPROFOR mandate, and various international treaties, in-
cluding the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Geneva Conventions, and 
Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Geno-
cide Convention).57 In response, the district court clarified that claimants de-
rived no third-party right to demand protection from the State simply because 
the State had put its troops at the UN’s disposal to implement Resolution 
836.58 Any failure that occurred while Dutchbat implemented the mandate or 
an order from UN officials was attributable to the UN; however, since the UN 
was dismissed from the case in 2008, these failures were not addressed.59 The 
only failures the district court examined were those resulting from the State 
exercising control over Dutchbat.60 
                                                                                                                           
 54 See Mothers of Srebrenica IV, ¶ 4.4. 
 55 See HR [Neth. Supreme Court] 6 september 2013, No. 12/03329, ¶¶ 3.5.2, .8.1–.2 (Nether-
lands/Mustafić), https://www.rechtspraak.nl/Organisatie-en-contact/Organisatie/Hoge-Raad-der-
Nederlanden/Supreme-court-of-the-Netherlands/Documents/12%2003329%20(1).pdf [https://perma.
cc/M5J8-6CCQ]; HR [Neth. Supreme Court] 6 september 2013, No. 12/03324, ¶¶ 3.5.2, 3.8.1–.8.2 
(Netherlands/Nuhanović), https://www.rechtspraak.nl/Organisatie-en-contact/Organisatie/Hoge-Raad-
der-Nederlanden/Supreme-court-of-the-Netherlands/Documents/12%2003324.pdf [https://perma.cc/
TA38-FB5U]; Mothers of Srebrenica IV, ¶¶ 4.29, 4.32–.33. Two prior cases decided by the Supreme 
Court of the Netherlands established that the effective control criterion had to be met in order to at-
tribute Dutchbat actions to the State. Mothers of Srebrenica IV, ¶ 4.33. 
 56 See Mothers of Srebrenica IV, ¶ 3.2. 
 57 Id.; see U.N. Charter arts. 1, 51; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter ECHR]; Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the 
Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Con-
vention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 
U.N.T.S. 277; S.C. Res. 836, supra note 23; S.C. Res. 743, supra note 14. 
 58 See Mothers of Srebrenica IV, ¶ 4.27. 
 59 See id. ¶ 4.28. 
 60 See id. ¶ 4.29. 
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C. Attributable Actions and Jurisdiction of the State in the Safe Area 
The district court reiterated that the criterion of effective control had to be 
met in order to attribute Dutchbat conduct to the State.61 In determining effec-
tive control, the district court first had to define the extent to which the State 
transferred command and control of Dutchbat to the UN.62 It concluded that 
after the State agreed to put Dutchbat forces at the UN’s disposal, the UN as-
sumed operational command and control over Dutchbat, which then functioned 
as a contingent of UNPROFOR.63 Consequently, the district court confirmed 
that the Security Council held primary responsibility for commanding Dutch-
bat peacekeepers in Srebrenica, leaving the State with no formal competence 
regarding Dutchbat’s implementation of the mandate.64 
The district court noted that the State retained the following rights: con-
trol over selection and training of troops, authority to withdraw Dutchbat from 
the mission, and authority to discipline military personnel or subject them to 
criminal law for their malfeasance.65 In so doing, the district court made a key 
distinction between those actions Dutchbat took under UN orders, and those it 
took either under direction from the State or as an independent ultra vires ac-
tion against UN instruction.66 Any action under UN instruction was not at-
tributable to the State.67 Conversely, any ultra vires action, whether or not ex-
plicitly ordered by the State, was deemed attributable to the State because it 
retained effective control over preparation, withdrawal, and discipline of 
Dutchbat.68 
                                                                                                                           
 61 Id. ¶¶ 4.33–.34. “Effective control” was defined as the State having an actual say or exercising 
factual control over Dutchbat’s specific actions. Id. 
 62 See id. ¶ 4.36. 
 63 See id. ¶ 4.37. The district court used a 1994 report from the UN Secretary-General to form a 
working definition of UN “control and command.” See id. ¶ 4.42. The report asserted that the UN 
exercised not full, but “operational command” with the authority to issue operational directives within 
the limits of (1) a specific mandate of the UN Security Council (Security Council); (2) an agreed peri-
od of time, with the stipulation that an earlier withdrawal requires adequate prior notification; and (3) 
a specific geographical range. See U.N. Secretary-General, Comprehensive Review of the Whole Ques-
tion of Peace-Keeping Operations in All Their Aspects: Command and Control of United Nations 
Peace-keeping Operations, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. A/49/681 (Nov. 21, 1994). 
 64 Mothers of Srebrenica IV, ¶¶ 4.38, .40. The district court dismissed as irrelevant the fact that 
certain Dutch nationals occupied positions in the UN chain of command, finding their presence alone 
did not lead to an inference that the State retained effective control. See id. ¶¶ 4.50, .52. Similarly, the 
fact that contact between The Hague and Dutch UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) officers intensi-
fied before the fall of Srebrenica did not indicate the State exercised effective control. See id. ¶ 4.54. 
 65 Id. ¶ 4.41. 
 66 See id. ¶¶ 4.57–.58, .68. Ultra vires actions were defined as any actions taken beyond the au-
thority given by the UN, or contrary to UN instructions. Id. 
 67 See id. ¶¶ 4.57, .68. 
 68 See id. ¶¶ 4.41, .57–.58. 
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With one exception, the district court concluded the State exercised no ef-
fective control over Dutchbat prior to the fall of Srebrenica.69 Therefore, the 
State was not liable for Dutchbat’s failure to protect the populace within the 
safe area until after BSA took Srebrenica.70 
After BSA captured Srebrenica at about eleven o’clock on the night of Ju-
ly 11, 1995, Dutchbat entered into what the district court labeled a “transitional 
period.”71 This phase is of particular importance because it marked the failure 
and resultant termination of the UNPROFOR mandate.72 It also signaled the 
beginning of a period in which the State became involved in the refugee evac-
uation and began to exercise effective control over Dutchbat’s actions within 
the mini safe area.73 The district court specified that actions attributable to the 
State were limited solely to Dutchbat’s treatment of refugees within the mini 
safe area demarcated after the fall of Srebrenica.74 As a result, the district court 
granted only a few of claimants’ claims regarding Dutchbat actions under the 
effective control of the State.75 For actions falling outside of the State’s effec-
tive control, there were typically other factors—such as decision-making pow-
ers resting within the UN chain of command—that defeated claimants’ argu-
ments.76 
Turning next to the problem of jurisdiction over the safe area, the district 
court accepted a portion of claimants’ argument, holding that the State had ef-
                                                                                                                           
 69 See id. ¶ 4.79. The exception concerned Dutchbat’s abandonment of its “blocking positions.” 
See id. The district court dismissed accusations that Dutchbat abandoned the blocking positions too 
readily, citing evidence that Dutchbat had insufficient equipment and manpower to repel BSA forces, 
making their abandonment not unreasonable in context. See id. ¶ 4.189. 
 70 See id. ¶ 4.79. 
 71 See id. ¶ 4.84. 
 72 See id. ¶ 4.82. 
 73 See id. ¶¶ 4.82–.85, .87. 
 74 See id. ¶ 4.90. The district court considered that because UNPROFOR Deputy Commander 
Gobilliard ordered Dutchbat to protect the refugees “in [their] care” immediately after Dutchbat’s 
withdrawal to Potočari, the order could only reasonably relate to the refugees within the mini safe 
area. See id. Any action against that order within the mini safe area was ultra vires and thus attributa-
ble to the State. See id. Consequently, Dutchbat’s conduct before the transitional period or toward 
refugees outside the mini safe area did not fall under the State’s effective control. See id. ¶¶ 4.87, 
.104. 
 75 Id. ¶ 4.91. Actions falling under the State’s effective control included: abandoning the blocking 
positions to deter BSA’s advance, not reporting all war crimes observed within the mini safe area, not 
providing adequate medical care to the refugees within the mini safe area, handing over weapons and 
equipment to BSA during the refugee evacuation, maintaining the decision not to allow all refugees 
into the compound at Potočari, separating men from other refugees during the evacuation, and cooper-
ating in the evacuation of refugees from the compound. Id. 
 76 See id. ¶¶ 4.104–.113, .130–.139, .142. Dutchbat actions not under the State’s effective control 
included: interference with and cessation of close air support to Dutchbat; failure of French helicop-
ters to appear and be deployed, thus thwarting plans to recapture Srebrenica; initial refusal to allow all 
refugees into the compound at Potočari before the beginning of the transitional period; and Dutchbat 
advising male refugees to flee into the woods near Srebrenica and neglecting to sound a general alarm 
when male refugees fled into the woods around Srebrenica. See id. 
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fective control over the entire mini safe area after the fall of Srebrenica.77 Cit-
ing the Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom judgment as precedent, the district court 
reasoned that because (1) Dutchbat was the only military presence in the safe 
area and thus exercised effective control over the area, and (2) the UN exer-
cised almost no actual say over Dutchbat actions within the fenced off com-
pound at Potočari after the fall of Srebrenica, the State then assumed effective 
control over Dutchbat and responsibility for the observance of human rights 
within the mini safe area.78 
D. Applicable National and International Laws 
Though Dutchbat’s conduct arose in the context of a UN mission, the dis-
trict court concluded that the law of the Netherlands applied to claimants’ valid 
claims, given that the unlawful acts in question were attributable to the State.79 
This conclusion was bolstered by the State’s own allowance that it made no 
difference whether unlawfulness of the acts was determined by Bosnian law or 
the law of the Netherlands.80 
The district court then turned to the State’s Constitution to determine the 
applicability of international laws.81 Under Section 93 of the Constitution, pro-
visions of treaties and decisions of international law organizations may be le-
gally binding on all party states (not simply signatories) as a matter of custom-
ary international law once they are published, provided that they sufficiently 
specify the right conferred and the obligation it imposes on parties to the pro-
vision.82 
Accordingly, the district court affirmed that the right to life in ECHR Ar-
ticle 2 and ICCPR Article 6, as well as the prohibition of torture and inhuman 
treatment contained in ECHR Article 3 and ICCPR Article 7 were binding on 
all, reinforced by the State’s obligation as a convention party in both instanc-
                                                                                                                           
 77 Id. ¶ 4.160. 
 78 See Mothers of Srebrenica IV, ¶¶ 4.154, .160 (citing Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom [GC], 2011-
IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 107, 167–69). This case established that a contracting state may be liable for con-
duct—whether lawful or unlawful—in a foreign state when, through its troops, it performs functions 
normally performed by the government of that foreign state. See id. 
 79 See Mothers of Srebrenica IV, ¶ 4.171. 
 80 See id. ¶ 4.172. The State volunteered that any differences between the laws of Bosnia and the 
Netherlands would only be relevant when settling the amount of immaterial damage. See id. 
 81 GW. [Constitution] art. 93; see Mothers of Srebrenica IV, ¶ 4.148. 
 82 GW. [Constitution] art. 93. The Constitution sets forth that a treaty provision or decision made 
by an international law organization may qualify as “binding on all” after it is published. See id. The 
district court asserted that such a provision or decision may be “binding on all” so long as it can be 
immediately applied in cases submitted to a court of law. Mothers of Srebrenica IV, ¶ 4.148. The 
treaty provision must precisely define the right(s) it confers or obligation(s) it imposes so that any 
national legal system can easily and objectively apply it. See id. 
2017] The Legacy of Srebrenica in Modern Peacekeeping 353 
es.83 The district court deemed the Genocide Convention applicable because, 
though it was not “binding on all” in the sense described in the Constitution, 
the State was still beholden to it as a convention state.84 The district court dis-
missed claimants’ contention that violation of the UNPROFOR mandate was a 
valid basis for their claims of unlawfulness.85 It elaborated that the mandate 
possessed only a powers-creating character, and did not give rise to enforcea-
ble legal obligations.86 
E. Unlawfulness of Attributable Actions 
In analyzing actions attributable to the State, the district court identified 
two requisite elements for attributing liability for unlawful conduct.87 First, 
whether the officials’ actions were unreasonable given the information they 
possessed at the time of action.88 Second, a causal link needed to be present, 
whereby the court could establish with a sufficient degree of certainty that the 
men from the safe area would not have been killed without the unlawful ac-
tions of the State.89 After applying the standard of care and causal link heuris-
tic, the district court concluded the State was liable for only one unlawful ac-
tion—Dutchbat actively assisting BSA in separating male refugees from the 
other refugees during evacuation from the compound.90 All other actions of 
which the State was accused were either deemed unlawful but lacking the 
causal link, or not unlawful.91 
The district court dramatically curtailed the extent of the State’s liability, 
acknowledging that the extreme circumstances of war factored heavily into its 
assessment of the reasonableness of Dutchbat’s conduct.92 Liability was re-
duced until it applied solely to family members—all of whom were represent-
ed by the Association of the Mothers of Srebrenica—of the men who were de-
ported from the compound in the afternoon of July 13, 1995, and subsequently 
                                                                                                                           
 83 ICCPR, supra note 57, arts. 6–7; ECHR, supra note 57, arts. 2–3; Mothers of Srebrenica IV, 
¶ 4.152. 
 84 See GW. [Constitution] art. 93; Mothers of Srebrenica IV, ¶¶ 4.163–.164, .179. 
 85 Mothers of Srebrenica IV, ¶ 4.149. 
 86 Id. 
 87 See id. ¶¶ 4.180, .182. 
 88 See id. ¶ 4.180. 
 89 See id. ¶ 4.182. 
 90 See id. ¶¶ 4.116, .312, .316. 
 91 See id. ¶¶ 4.273, 4.276–.277. The actions deemed unlawful were not reporting all observed war 
crimes. Id. Nonetheless, the district court reasoned this would not have led to timely military interven-
tion that would have saved the men executed by BSA. See id. The actions deemed not unlawful in-
cluded: abandoning the blocking positions, not providing adequate medical care to the refugees, advis-
ing male refugees to flee into the woods, handing over weapons and other equipment to BSA, uphold-
ing the decision to not allow all refugees into the compound, and assisting in the evacuation by form-
ing a lock and guiding the refugees to the buses. Id. ¶¶ 4.335–.337. 
 92 See id. ¶ 4.181. 
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executed by BSA.93 The State was ordered to pay only the costs of legal pro-
ceedings; all other claims were dismissed.94 
The district court’s systematic limitation of liability, beginning with a 
broad discussion of UN immunity and narrowing into a nuanced analysis of 
specific actions taken by Dutchbat and the State, set a controversial prece-
dent.95 This decision posited fundamental questions to the international legal 
community concerning the propriety of intervention by the UN and its Member 
States.96 As the landscape of contemporary conflict shifts away from war con-
fined to a specific geographical range within a certain period of time, and to-
wards decentralized and unpredictable acts of violence and terrorism, Mothers 
of Srebrenica calls into question the essential efficacy of UN peacekeeping 
operations and existing methods of ensuring their accountability.97 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Policy Underpinnings of the District Court’s Decision 
Since the massacres in Srebrenica and Rwanda, both of which targeted 
persons under the protection of UN peacekeeping operations, a considerable 
body of research has examined the privileges and immunities of the UN.98 The 
                                                                                                                           
 93 See id. ¶ 4.342. 
 94 Id. ¶¶ 4.344, 5.1–.4. Damages for claimants’ loss were not awarded because the district court 
rejected their claim that the State’s agreement to supply troops for the UNPROFOR mission constitut-
ed an agreement to a third-party clause that extended an obligation to protect claimants and their fami-
lies. See id. ¶¶ 4.27–.28. 
 95 See Brockman-Hawe, supra note 7, at 730, 736–38; Hasanbasic, supra note 8, at 445. 
 96 See Boon, supra note 6, at 378–79; Guido den Dekker, Immunity of the United Nations Before 
the Dutch Courts, HAGUE JUST. PORTAL 4–5, 7 (July 28, 2008), http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/
Docs/Commentaries%20PDF/Den_Dekker_Srebrenica_HJP.pdf [https://perma.cc/2NKQ-99SZ]; 
Hovell, supra note 13, at 34; Frederick Rawski, To Waive or Not to Waive: Immunity and Accounta-
bility in U.N. Peacekeeping Operations, 18 CONN. J. INT’L L. 103, 127 (2002); Anastasia Telesetsky, 
Binding the United Nations: Compulsory Review of Disputes Involving UN International Responsibil-
ity Before the International Court of Justice, 21 MINN. J. INT’L L. 75, 84 (2012). 
 97 See Bosetti, supra note 7; Brockman-Hawe, supra note 7; Hasanbasic, supra note 8 (arguing 
that increased State liability is necessary to provide just legal remedies to victims of peacekeeper 
malfeasance, and suggesting the Nuhanović case before the Supreme Court of the Netherlands pro-
vides a favorable example). 
 98 See, e.g., Boon, supra note 6 (analyzing the disjointed standards of immunity between the UN 
and its Member States, and calling for increased UN Member State (Member State) involvement in 
reconsidering if UN immunity legitimately serves the interests of those purportedly benefitting from 
UN peacekeeping operations); den Dekker, supra note 96, at 2–4 (using the District Court of The 
Hague’s 2008 dismissal of the UN as party to the case to analyze “whether immunity can be restricted 
if it is incompatible with peremptory or other fundamental standards of international law”); Hovell, 
supra note 13, at 1 (arguing that “[e]conomizing on due process standards” by applying a blanket of 
absolute immunity to the UN for its peacekeepers’ wrongdoings “is proving to be a false economy”); 
Rawski, supra note 96 (asserting that unfettered immunity for individuals functioning in their capacity 
as UN officials is an unacceptable extension of UN immunity); Telesetsky, supra note 96, at 75 
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general consensus is that, given its foundation in the Convention on Privileges 
and Immunities and Article 105 of the UN Charter, as well as its nearly uni-
form support in customary international law, the UN is all but legally impene-
trable.99 Thus, the district court’s decision to dismiss the UN as party to the 
case was not shocking.100 Perhaps more startling was the district court’s appar-
ent willingness to hand down a judgment that, for all intents and purposes, left 
the mothers without adequate remedy for the loss of their family.101 
One potential explanation for this result is that the district court was 
tasked with an impossible public policy conundrum.102 On one hand, the dis-
trict court faced a group of mothers who had suffered devastating losses due to 
clear failure of the UNPROFOR operation.103 Equitable considerations would 
stress the need for the adoption of a broad view of effective control, so as to 
provide the mothers with some form of just remedy.104 Adopting such a view 
would have resulted in heavy attribution of responsibility to the State, which, 
arguably, it could have withstood without suffering a crippling financial or po-
litical loss.105 On the other hand, the district court had to consider the long-
term implications of its decision on the overall functioning of UN peacekeep-
ing.106 Had the district court adopted an expansive view of effective control, 
increased ascription of liability, though not catastrophic to the instant party, 
                                                                                                                           
(“States should . . . enlarge the ICJ’s practice of issuing advisory opinions that ‘bind’ parties to guar-
antee that the doctrine of international organization responsibility is coherently applied to the UN.”). 
 99 See U.N. Charter art. 105, ¶ 1; G.A. Res. 22 (I), supra note 53, art. II, §2; den Dekker, supra 
note 96, at 4; Hovell, supra note 13, at 33. 
 100 See U.N. Charter art. 105, ¶ 1; G.A. Res. 22 (I), supra note 53, art. II, §2; den Dekker, supra 
note 96, at 4; Hovell, supra note 13, at 33. 
 101 See Rb. ’s-Gravenhage [Hague District Court] 16 juli 2014, No. 09/295247 / HA ZA 07-2973, 
¶¶ 5.1–.4 (Mothers of Srebrenica/Netherlands) (Mothers of Srebrenica IV) (Neth.); Boon, supra note 
7, at 343. 
 102 See Boon, supra note 6, at 346–47, 377; Patrick J. Lewis, Who Pays for the United Nations’ 
Torts?: Immunity, Attribution, and “Appropriate Modes of Settlement,” 39 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. 
REG. 259, 300 (2014). 
 103 See Mothers of Srebrenica IV, ¶¶ 3.1, 3.2.1, 4.82. 
 104 See Boon, supra note 6, at 343, 356. The UN has recognized an individual’s right to a remedy 
for injury; however, the UN limits its financial and temporal liability by excluding injuries resulting 
from actions deemed necessary to a peacekeeping operation’s function. See id. 
 105 See Mothers of Srebrenica IV, ¶¶ 5.1–.4; see, e.g., Brian Martin, Managing Outrage Over 
Genocide: Case Study Rwanda, 21 GLOBAL CHANGE, PEACE & SECURITY 275 (2009) (illustrating 
how Member States Bangladesh, Belgium, and Ghana were not attacked for their peacekeepers’ fail-
ure in preventing the Rwandan genocide, leaving the UN to bear the brunt of international criticisms); 
Declan Walsh Nicola Byrne, UN Peacekeepers Criticized, SCOTSMAN (Dec. 22, 2002), https://www.
globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/199/40816.html [https://perma.cc/N9EE-WYEZ] (provid-
ing examples in which UN peacekeepers were punished for crimes like murder, sexual exploitation, 
and rape, taking the focus off their corresponding Member States). 
 106 See Boon, supra note 6, at 346; Lewis, supra note 102. 
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could have drastically curbed other UN Member States’ willingness to contrib-
ute troops.107 
The question remains, however, whether the district court’s decision will 
produce the desired effect of sustaining enthusiastic peacekeeping troop con-
tributions going forward.108 With the landscape of violent conflict changing at 
a rapid pace, especially in areas targeted by terrorist organizations,109 peace 
operations have begun to take an increasingly arduous toll on UN Member 
States’ resources.110 
B. Implications of the District Court’s Narrow View of Effective Control 
Since the UN’s inception in 1945,111 Member States have been relied up-
on exclusively to supply both troops and financing for peacekeeping opera-
tions worldwide.112 In order to fulfill the UN Charter goals of defending global 
values and preventing the recurrence of atrocities like the Holocaust,113 princi-
ple peacekeeping activities include: conflict prevention and peacemaking, 
peacekeeping, and peace-building.114 On a fundamental level, three prerequi-
sites are widely accepted as essential to an effective peacekeeping operation: 
consent of the parties to the peacekeepers’ presence, use of force only in self-
                                                                                                                           
 107 See Boon, supra note 6, at 346; Tom Dannenbaum, Translating the Standard of Effective Con-
trol into a System of Effective Accountability: How Liability Should Be Apportioned for Violations of 
Human Rights by Member State Troop Contingents Serving as United Nations Peacekeepers, 51 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 113, 170, 184 (2010); Lewis, supra note 103, at 300. 
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 109 See DAVID KEEN, ENDLESS WAR? 51 (2006); George R. Lucas, Jr., “New Rules for New 
Wars” International Law and Just War Doctrine for Irregular War, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 677, 
678 (2011). 
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history-united-nations/index.html [https://perma.cc/2GG7-JZ2Q]. 
 112 See Otto Spijkers, What’s Running the World: Global Values, International Law, and the 
United Nations, 4 INTERDISC. J. HUM. RTS. L. 77, 98 (2010); Financing Peacekeeping, supra note 
110. 
 113 See U.N. Charter arts. 1, 51; Press Release, Secretary-General, Kofi Annan Emphasizes 
Commitment to Enabling UN Never Again to Fail in Protecting Civilian Population from Genocide or 
Mass Slaughter, U.N. Press Release SG/SM/7263 (Dec. 16, 1999) [hereinafter Press Release, Secre-
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 114 See U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, Identi-
cal letters dated Aug. 21, 2000 from the Secretary-General to the President of the General Assembly 
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2017] The Legacy of Srebrenica in Modern Peacekeeping 357 
defense, and complete neutrality in the eyes of the parties in conflict.115 The 
third prerequisite—complete neutrality of UN peacekeepers—was tagged as 
one of the fundamental contributing factors to Dutchbat’s failure in Srebrenica 
and is what led UN officials to engage in a major overhaul of the UN’s concep-
tualization of peacekeepers roles and responsibilities in conflict zones.116 Now, 
UN peacekeeping operations appear to be compensating for their past failings 
by accepting more varied responsibilities and sanctioning the use of force 
where necessary to protect civilians.117 The emergence of more aggressive 
peacekeeping operations marks a trend toward offensive UN mandates, as op-
posed to traditionally neutral and defensive ones.118 Some scholars have postu-
lated that it seems extremely likely that these aggressive peace-making tactics 
will result in more numerous claims against troop contributing countries for 
causing death and injury during conflict.119 
C. Potential Peacekeeping Hurdles Due to Narrow Effective Control 
One illustrative example of the potentially detrimental effects of the dis-
trict court’s decision is the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabi-
lization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).120 Deployed on July 1, 2013, MI-
NUSMA’s functions have run the gamut of peacekeeping operations: to protect 
civilians and promote human rights, facilitate negotiation between political 
parties in conflict, reestablish the State authority, protect UN personnel, sup-
port cultural preservation, and rebuild the security sector throughout Mali.121 
MINUSMA forces, spread across the entire country, continuously run up 
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against a number of armed Islamist groups, many of which have connections to 
international terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda.122 Many of these groups 
have been fighting for years to gain control over Mali and advance the spread 
of Islam through the use of terrorist tactics.123 In the two years and eight 
months from MINUSMA’s inception on April 25, 2013 to December 31, 2015, 
there were 223 recorded terrorist incidents in Mali,124 some of which directly 
targeted MINUSMA forces.125 
The unprecedented damage sustained by UN peacekeepers in Mali, reach-
ing 105 fatalities and 200 injuries in just three years, has earned MINUSMA 
the title of “World’s Most Dangerous Peacekeeping Mission.”126 At the rec-
ommendation of Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, the number of MINUSMA 
peacekeepers has already increased to over 12,000 troops, surpassing its origi-
nal forecast of 11,200 military personnel.127 This is a new genre of peacekeep-
ing, one that poses new and potentially unresolvable challenges to UN peace-
keeping operations.128 Unlike previous conflicts, such as the BSA attack on 
Srebrenica,129 violence of the kind MINUSMA faces is geographically dis-
persed, instigated by habitually decentralized terrorist organizations, targeting 
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both civilians and military personnel, and frequently motivated by religious as 
well as political aims instead of solely territorial gain.130 
However great its desire to avert disasters like the Srebrenica massacre, 
without proper human resources, financing, and focused mandate, the UN may 
nonetheless be overextending itself and causing more harm than good in Ma-
li.131 Many sources, scholars and politicians alike, contend that the global war 
on terror—in which many of the terrorist groups in Mali are arguably key 
players—lacks any foreseeable end.132 Instead of extinguishing terrorism in 
places like Mali, UN peacekeepers may in fact be aggravating terrorist groups 
further, ineffectively resisting and unintentionally causing massive civilian and 
UN personnel casualties.133 
By so drastically limiting the State’s effective control in Mothers of Sre-
brenica, the district court has set a precedent that has already accomplished its 
short-term goal of sustaining enthusiastic troop contribution.134 Following this 
line of logic, the district court’s decision may also have contributed to the 
maintenance of UN and its Member States’ involvement in indeterminate vio-
lence, like the strife in Mali.135 The indefinite nature of conflict with transna-
tional terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda, Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, 
Ansar Dine, and Mouvement pour l’unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest 
will inevitably put a hefty strain on peacekeeping resources.136 Consequently, 
the enthusiasm the district court sought to foster through its limitation of the 
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State’s—and, by extension, all troop contributing countries’—liability, may 
decline sharply as Member States’ debt and death tolls rise in years to come.137 
If the district court had instead adopted a broader view of the State’s ef-
fective control, it could have set a precedent more closely aligned with the 
UN’s ostensive aim of improving its peace operations’ efficacy.138 Though ex-
panding liability for peacekeepers’ failings may have diminished Member 
States’ willingness to contribute troops in the short-term, it could also have 
forced the UN to examine more judiciously the deficiencies of its current 
peacekeeping model.139 For example, in light of the increasingly deadly and 
unpredictable terrorist attacks in Mali despite increased MINUSMA military 
presence, critical reflection on the UN’s limited capacity to make peace could 
spur the organization to alter its approach.140 This could lead to the UN calling 
on alternative military reinforcement, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organ-
ization (NATO), which could be better equipped to address terrorist threats.141 
Though simply conjectural at this point, because the UN already has been publi-
cally upbraided for its reluctance to call on NATO in instances like Srebrenica, it 
seems possible that ceding peace-making responsibilities to alternative military 
organizations would be a more prudent and efficacious course of action.142 
CONCLUSION 
Though likely motivated by a commendable goal of averting the demise 
of UN peacekeeping, the district court’s adoption of a narrow view of effective 
control in Mothers of Srebrenica possibly has swung the policy pendulum too 
far towards nonexistent liability. The immediate goal of encouraging Member 
States to continue providing troops has been accomplished by reducing liabil-
ity for triggering death and injury during UN missions. Nonetheless, in light of 
the recent overhaul and expansion of the UN’s peacekeeping approach, this 
goal appears overzealous. Peacekeeping now entails more complex and dan-
gerous missions, inevitably accompanied by rising death tolls and increased 
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demands on human and financial resources. Given the protracted and dynamic 
nature of the struggle against terrorism, it is doubtful operations like MI-
NUSMA will reach any logical conclusion in the near future. Without critical 
reflection on the long-term effects of low-liability for peacekeepers, these 
troop contributions, though doubtlessly motivated by many ethical and politi-
cal concerns, could be considered uninformed if not fundamentally misguided. 
  
 
